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Abstract
This paper applies contingent claim analysis to value pension contracts for real-life collective pension plans with intergenerational risk sharing
and offering DB-like beneﬁts. We rewrite the balance sheet of such a pension fund as an aggregate of embedded generational options. This implies
that a pension fund is a zero-sum game in value terms, so any policy change inevitably leads to value transfers between generations. We explore
intergenerational value transfers that may arise from a plan redesign or from changes in funding policy and risk sharing rules. We develop a
stochastic framework which accounts for time-varying investment opportunities and computes the embedded generational options. Changes in the
values of the generational options enable us to evaluate the impact of policy modiﬁcations in the pension contract with respect to intergenerational
transfers and redistribution. We ﬁnd that a switch to a less risky asset mix is beneﬁcial to elderly members at the expense of younger members
who lose value. A reallocation of risk bearing from a plan with ﬂexible contributions and ﬁxed beneﬁts to a plan with ﬁxed contributions and
ﬂexible beneﬁts leads to value redistribution from older plan members to younger ones.
c   2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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The pension fund industry worldwide is in a turbulent
period. The combination of falling stock returns and falling
interest rates after 2000 caused a major funding crisis for
traditional deﬁned beneﬁt plans. On top of that, the introduction
of fair value principles in the pension fund industry has had
a profound impact. The trend is to deﬁne more explicit and
transparent pension contracts (Kortleve et al., 2006). In the US
and UK private sectors, DB plans have largely been replaced
by individual deﬁned contribution (DC) plans (Munnell, 2006).
Employer-sponsored DB plans also have been replaced by
stand-alone pension funds with DB-like beneﬁts, where risks
are shared between the younger and older generations of plan
members according to explicit rules (Boeri et al., 2006). Many
pension funds in the Netherlands have recently taken this route
(Ponds and van Riel, 2007). Also, sectorwide pension funds and
public sector pension funds in countries such as Canada, the US
and Finland have moved in the direction of stand-alone risk-
sharing cooperatives (Ambachtsheer, 2007).
It is well documented that collectively funded pension
schemes with intergenerational risk sharing may be welfare
enhancing.1 Current and future plan participants are able to
share shocks in asset returns and labour income and thereby
smooth these shocks over and even beyond the lifespan of any
single generation (Cui et al., 2006; Gollier, 2007; Teulings and
de Vries, 2006). Surpluses or deﬁcits in the funding process can
be shared between younger and older generations and future
generations by adjusting either contributions, beneﬁt levels
or a combination of these. Mandatory participation backed
by appropriate government legislation makes this long run
smoothing possible as future generations cannot opt out when
they are confronted with a low initial level of funding. However,
Cui et al. (2006) show that even pension funds with deﬁcits
in their funding offer welfare improvements for new young
entrants.
The move to stand-alone risk-sharing cooperatives has
been accompanied by a change in risk bearing in order to
1 For a general exposition on the welfare aspects of intergenerational risk
sharing, see Gordon and Varian (1988) and Shiller (1999). Contributions to the
extensive literature in the ﬁeld of pensions can be divided into the categories of
risk sharing via “pay-as-you-go” plans (see Merton (1983), Enders and Lapan
(1982) and Krueger and Kubler (2006)) and risk sharing via funded plans (see
Cui et al. (2006) and Gollier (2007)).
create a more robust solvency position in ﬁnancial downturns.
An example of this type of reform is the compensation of
pensions for inﬂation. Traditional DB plans always offered
inﬂation indexation irrespective of the solvency position of
the pension fund. Recently stand-alone risk-sharing plans
have reconsidered indexation policy by introducing inﬂation
compensation rules conditional on the ﬁnancial position of
the fund. For risk sharing cooperatives, a crucial question is
what the impact is of pension reforms on different groups
of participants. It is not hard to imagine that speciﬁc policy
changes will harm some groups of beneﬁciaries but will be
beneﬁcial to others.
In ﬁnancial markets, the no-arbitrage principle guarantees
that the market-based compensation for risk taken is fair,
such that risk-taking is compensated by an appropriate reward.
Within pension funds, the rules of the pension contract deﬁne
the risk and reward allocation among the members. Unlike
option holders in the ﬁnancial markets, it is not guaranteed
that the participants in DB schemes are fairly compensated
for their risk-taking. Embedded value transfers may occur
when the risk bearing parties are not properly compensated.
This can endanger the long-term sustainability of pension
schemes. In the current ageing society, younger participants
demand more transparency in the implicit risks they are
exposed to. This paper focuses on the exploration of embedded
value transfers induced by changes in the pension deal. The
pricing of these embedded transfers should be based on how
risks are priced in the market. Similar to ﬁnancial options
we therefore apply contingent claims analysis as a market
consistent method to value the embedded options in the pension
contract.
The contribution of this paper is to value generational
transfers in real-existing collective pension plans. As a ﬁrst
step we identify embedded generational options by rewriting
the balance sheet of a pension fund. Changes in the value
of generational options enable us to evaluate the impact
of policy switches in the pension contract with respect to
intergenerational transfers and redistribution. In the second
step we use a stochastic valuation framework which also
captures time-varying investment opportunities. We explore
intergenerational value transfers that may result from a plan
redesign or from changes in funding policy and risk sharing
rules.Author's personal copy
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This paper innovates in combining three building blocks.
The ﬁrst building block is the ﬁeld of generational accounting
as developed in public ﬁnance. We use this method to frame a
pension fund in terms of generational accounts. A generational
account in a pension fund is deﬁned as the difference between
beneﬁts to be received and contributions to be paid by a
speciﬁc age cohort. The second building block is the valuation
of these generational accounts as embedded options with the
help of deﬂators. As the third building block, we employ an
asset liability management (ALM) model. ALM has proved
its usefulness in its ability to simulate, in a stochastic and
integrated framework, the often complex real life cashﬂow
patterns between a pension fund and its stakeholders. The
output of the ALM model is used to value the various
generational embedded options.
Generational accounting was developed by public ﬁnance
economists to investigate intergenerational distributional
effects of ﬁscal policy (Auerbach et al., 1999; Kotlikoff,
2002). Generational accounting reveals the zero-sum feature
of government ﬁnance—what some generations receive as an
increase in net lifetime income must be paid for by other
generations, who will experience a decrease in net lifetime
income. Generational accounting is also of relevance for
collective pension plans with intergenerational risk sharing.
These plans indeed can be framed as a zero-sum game as
well, implying that changes in the funding strategy or an
adjustment in risk allocation rules will lead to intergenerational
redistribution (Ponds, 2003).
Furthermore, this study is indebted to the literature on
framing pension funds in terms of embedded options. Since
the classic paper of Sharpe (1976), there has been a large
number of applications of contingent claim analysis to real-
life problems in the ﬁelds of pensions and insurance (Blake,
1998; Steenkamp, 1999; Chapman et al., 2001; Guill´ en et al.,
2006; Kortleve and Ponds, 2006; Kocken, 2006). Ponds
(2003) uses a simple one-period binomial model to show
that intergenerational value transfers occur when different
generations in the pension fund do not get market-based
compensation for the risks allocated to them. He calls this
approach “value-based generational accounting”. Cui et al.
(2006) apply this approach to a multi-period setting for the
purpose of analysing the welfare aspects of intergenerational
risk sharing. They show intergenerational risk sharing within
a pension fund is indeed a zero-sum game in value terms;
however well-structured plans may be a positive-sum game
in welfare terms compared with the optimal individual plan
without risk sharing. The welfare analysis is performed from
the perspective of a new worker aged 25.
There is a broad literature on asset liability modelling (see
Zenios and Ziemba (2007) for an overview). As in Boender
(1997), Bauer et al. (2006) and Boender et al. (2007), we
use a scenario approach to asset–liability management. We
develop an integral ALM framework with a realistic description
of the policy tools available for pension funds in operation
regarding asset allocation, indexation policy, and contribution
rate setting. The ALM analysis incorporates term structures
of risk as in Campbell and Viceira (2005). The accompanying
time-varying investment opportunities are important for long-
term institutional investors like pension funds (see Hoevenaars
et al., 2005). The modelling framework adapts the pricing
kernel and deﬁnes an afﬁne term structure of interest rates as in
Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005). We show how the value-based
ALM concept adds an extra dimension to the traditional ALM
output.
This paper is the ﬁrst to apply the methodology of embedded
generational options to real existing pension funds with inter-
generational risk sharing. We explore intergenerational trans-
fers that result from policy changes. These intergenerational
value transfers are calculated as changes in the value of em-
bedded generational options resulting from these policy adjust-
ments. We ﬁnd that any policy change inevitably will lead to
value transfers. A switch to a less risky asset mix is beneﬁcial
to older plan participants at the expense of the younger mem-
bers, who lose value. A reallocation of risk from ﬂexible con-
tributions with ﬁxed beneﬁts to ﬁxed contributions with ﬂexi-
ble beneﬁts leads to value redistribution from older members to
younger ones.
The set up of the paper is as follows. The framework of
generational accounting is introduced in Section 2. Then we
explain the method of value-based generational accounting.
Section 3 highlights the relevance of value-based ALM.
Section 4 describes the methodology of embedded generational
options.Section5appliesthemethodologytoastylizedpension
fund which is representative for a real existing stand-alone
multimember plan. As an illustration we analyse some recent
policy reforms in the Netherlands in Section 6. We close the
paper with a discussion of how the proposed method can be
applied to other areas, like generational accounting in public
ﬁnance and reforms in social security.
2. Generational accounting under uncertainty
Generational accounting is a method developed by
public ﬁnance economists as a tool for investigating
the intergenerational distributional effects of ﬁscal policy
(Auerbach et al., 1999; Kotlikoff, 2002). Generational
accounting is based on the government’s intertemporal budget
constraint, which requires that either current or future
generations pay for government spending via taxation. The
government’s net wealth (including debt) plus the present
value of the government’s net receipts from all current and
future generations, must be sufﬁcient to pay for the present
value of the government’s current and future consumption.
The generational accounting method can be employed for
calculating the present value changes in net lifetime income
of both living and future generations that result from changes
in ﬁscal policy. Generational accounting reveals the zero-sum
feature of the intertemporal budget constraint of government
ﬁnance—what some generations receive as an increase in net
lifetime income must be paid for by other generations who
will experience a decrease in net lifetime income. Planned
increase or decrease in government debt can be used for tax
smoothing over time in order to realize a sustainable ﬁscal
policy (Auerbach et al., 1999; van Ewijk et al., 2000).Author's personal copy
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Similarly, the method of generational accounting may be of
use in evaluating the policy of pension funds to cover both
current and future participants. Two similarities with public
ﬁnance can be discerned. First, pension funds also face an
intertemporal budget constraint, as the promised beneﬁts must
be backed by current and future contributions and returns
on paid contributions. Second, as the government uses the
tax instrument to close the budget over time, adjustments in
contribution and indexation rates are the instruments used by
pension funds to square the balance over time.
Economists using the generational accounting framework
for public ﬁnance issues ﬁnd difﬁculty in dealing with
uncertainty (Kotlikoff, 2002). Usually, a deterministic approach
is followed. Uncertainty is studied using a sensitivity analysis
for alternative assumptions for key variables, amongst them
the discount factor.2 However, a value-based approach is more
appropriate to deal with uncertainty. We rewrite the pension
fund in generational accounts and apply the value-based
approach. The uncertain cashﬂows from and to the participating
cohorts, in particular contributions and beneﬁts, are treated as
embedded generational options which can be valued with the
help of stochastic discount factors (see Section 4.2). Moreover
the value-based approach highlights the zero-sum character of
the contract. At any given time, the total economic value to
be distributed amongst the generations is equal to the value
of pension fund assets. Alternative funding and risk-allocation
rules have no impact on total economic value, but this may lead
to transfers of value between generations.
3. Asset liability management
3.1. Classical ALM
Pension funds use ALM analysis to evaluate the pension
contract in operation and to explore the performance of
alternative pension deals. Essentially, a pension contract deﬁnes
what is being promised, how the promises are funded (asset
mix and contribution policy) and who is bearing the risks in the
funding process (risk allocation rules). ALM is broadly seen
as a cornerstone for the fund policy as it provides insight into
the realism and the sustainability of the pension contract in
operation over differing horizons. Typically an ALM study uses
an economic model to produce stochastic simulations of returns
on asset classes and other relevant economic data, like inﬂation.
Subsequently a scenario analysis is performed that results
in probability distributions for the key variables. Sensitivity
analysis is usually carried out to explore speciﬁc policy variants
in terms of asset mix, contribution policy and indexation rules.
Policy variants are evaluated in terms of expected values
and relevant risk measures for key variables—for example,
2 The generational account approach as applied by public ﬁnance economists
also has been criticized for the neglect of general equilibrium repercussions
of changes in the budgetary policy of the government. Usually tax incidences
are ignored as well as impact of policy changes on relative prices (Buiter,
1997). This critique may be of relevance for government studies, but not for
this study as the pension fund in operation is sufﬁciently small to warrant a
partial analysis.
the funding ratio, the contribution rate, the indexation rate,
and so on. Moreover one can easily take care of speciﬁc
constraints, like funding requirements of the supervisor (e.g. a
minimum probability of underfunding) and a maximum level of
contribution rate.
3.2. Value-based ALM
Despite its widespread popularity, one may feel uncomfort-
able with the classical ALM tool kit. Chapman et al. (2001)
characterize ALM studies as producing merely “funnels of
doubt”, which serve only to demonstrate that taking more risk
will imply more uncertainty about key outputs. Moreover, it is
difﬁcult to rank policy variants using solely the classical ALM
output. Is a risky strategy with, on average, a high but volatile
funding ratio to be preferred above a less risky strategy that will
end up with, on average, a low funding ratio with little risk?
Younger members in a plan with intergenerational risk sharing
may prefer a risky strategy that could yield a high pay-out per
unit contribution, whereas older members will prefer a liability-
hedged investment strategy to safeguard pension fund assets
in order to reduce beneﬁt risk. Practitioners solve the ranking
problem by discovering the policy setting that is most accept-
able given the interests of all participants, taking into account
all constraints. However in seeking this ‘most acceptable’ pol-
icy variant, the ALM professionals and/or the board of trustees
do not usually consider whether the policy variant is fair in eco-
nomic value terms for all members. In ﬁnancial markets, the no
arbitrage principle guarantees that the market-based compensa-
tion for a taken risk is fair, so that risk taking is accompanied
by an appropriate reward compensation. Within pension funds,
the no arbitrage principle of ﬁnancial markets is replaced by
the rules of the pension contract deﬁning the risk and reward
allocation amongst the members.
Contingent claim analysis is fruitful to test for possible value
transfers. Restating the highly stylized framework of Sharpe
(1976) into a realistic setting results in what is now called
value-based ALM (Kortleve and Ponds, 2006). Value-based
ALM essentially uses the same output from scenario analysis as
classical ALM, but the future outcomes are discounted back to
the present with an appropriate risk adjusted discount rate. This
is achieved by making use of a pricing kernel speciﬁcation (see
Section 4.2 for technical details). Value-based ALM enables
us to detect possible transfers of value resulting from policy
changes by examining changes in the value of the various
embedded generational options as reﬂected in changing kernel
prices.
4. The pension fund as an aggregate of embedded
generational options
4.1. Pension fund characteristics
Before deriving generational accounts in a pension fund
setting, it may be useful to describe the speciﬁc institutional
characteristics of the pension fund. All funding risks must be
borne by current and future members of the pension plan. TheAuthor's personal copy
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content of the pension contract helps determine how surpluses
and deﬁcits in the funding process are allocated amongst
participants. Essentially there are three ways to allocate the
funding risks amongst the participants: (i) doing nothing
by shifting forward in time a position of underfunding or
overfunding, i.e. passing the gains/losses to future participants;
(ii) adjusting the contribution rate; or (iii) adjusting the
indexation rate.
The fund under study has the following features:
1. Pension plan: The pension plan is an average-wage plan
with indexed liabilities. Workers acquire for each year of
service 2% of their pensionable wage as new accrued liabilities.
The yearly indexation of beneﬁts and accrued liabilities aims
to follow the wage growth of the sector; however the actual
indexation may be contingent on the ﬁnancial position of the
pension fund.
2. Liabilities: The real value of accrued liabilities is the
value of liabilities when full indexation would always be
granted as promised. Valuation is based on discounting future
beneﬁt cashﬂows following from the liability structure using
the real interest yield curve net of real wage growth. The
nominal value of accrued liabilities is the value of liabilities
when no indexation would be given at all. The nominal value
of accrued liabilities is derived by discounting the future
beneﬁt cashﬂows using the prevailing nominal yield curve. The
duration of the indexed liabilities is 19 years (at a real rate of
2%). Sixty percent of the participants consists of pensioners.
The remaining 40% comprises the (current and future) active
members.
3. Funding ratio: The real funding ratio is deﬁned as the ratio
of assets over the value of real liabilities, the nominal funding
ratio is assets over the value of nominal liabilities.
4. Pension fund residue: The difference between assets and
nominal liabilities is called the pension fund residue.
5. Contribution rate: Workers pay yearly contributions out
of their wage income in order to fund new accrued liabilities in
that year. Total contributions must be equal to the present value
of new rights. We make a distinction between two approaches
in setting the level of the contribution rate. In line with many
real existing pension funds, the pension fund under study makes
use of the funding method. This method reﬂects the notion
that in the long run the sum of contributions plus investment
proceeds must match the stream of wage-indexed beneﬁts. In
this method, the present value of new liabilities is calculated
with the expected rate of return on assets net of wage growth
as the discount rate. The second method is called the fair
value accounting approach which uses as the discount rate the
nominal interest rate in the market minus wage growth.3
All workers pay the same uniform contribution rate as a
percentage of pensionable wages. This implies that young
workers pay more contributions than the present value of their
new accrued liabilities, whereas older workers contribute less
3 The term “fair value accounting” reﬂects that the same discount rate is
used as in the fair value reporting standards. In contrast, the funding approach
chooses a stable discount factor in order to mitigate contribution rate volatility.
This discount factor is used for funding purposes only, not for reporting.
than their new accrued liabilities. Younger workers grow older
so that at the end of their careers there will be a balance
betweenthevalueofpaidcontributionsandthevalueofaccrued
liabilities.4 Apart from the base contribution rate, an additional
contribution rate (positive or negative) may be asked in relation
to the funding position of the pension fund.
6. Investment policy: We assume a constant mix rebalancing
policy in which the investment manager rebalances to ﬁxed
asset weights at the end of each year. The investment universe
consists of stocks and bonds only.
4.2. Generational accounts as embedded options
The value of pension fund assets At is equal to the value of
total pension fund nominal liabilities Lt plus the pension fund
residue Rt:
At = Lt + Rt. (1)
The balance sheet next period (t + 1) expressed in present


















Inherent to the deﬂator approach is that the economic value
of initial assets plus investments proceeds is equal to initial
assets: V[At(1+rt+1)]=At withrt+1 as rate of return in t+1.
The term Vt[Ct+1] is the economic value at t of contributions
Ct+1 paid in t + 1a n dVt[PP t+1] is the economic value at t
of pension payments PP t+1 in t +1. The term Vt[Lt+1] stands
for the economic value of accrued liabilities at the end of period
t+1, being the sum of the accrued liabilities at the end of period
t, including indexation minus the liabilities written off in t + 1,
as they have been reserved for pension payments in t + 1 plus
the new accrued liabilities in t + 1 attributable to one year of
additional service of working members. The term Vt[Rt+1] is
the economic value at t of the pension fund residue at the end
of period t + 1, Rt+1.






















This expression says that the one year change in the value of
liabilities is backed by contributions and by either an increase
or a decrease in the pension fund residue. This reﬂects the zero-
sum nature of a pension fund. However, the zero-sum feature
does not hold necessarily for the different age cohorts. We





























 = 0 (4)
where x refers to cohort x. We call the term  GAx
t+1 the
generational account option of cohort x, that is deﬁned as the
4 We refer to H´ ari et al. (2006) for a general analysis of differences in
money’s worth of participation in a collective scheme due to differences in age,
gender and education level.Author's personal copy
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Fig. 1. Relative distribution of nominal liabilities in 2006 (y-axis) for various
age cohorts with age at 2006 on x-axis.
economic value at t of the change in the generational account
of cohort x during t + 1.
We assume that the pension fund residue can be allocated
amongst the cohorts at all times proportionately to each











Fig. 1 displays the relative distribution of nominal liabilities
over the cohorts in 2006. The size of lx initially increases with
age because cohorts have fulﬁlled more years of service, and
have more accrued liabilities, and because the time value of
accrued liabilities increases as the age of retirement nears. The
size of lx
t will decline in retirement as liabilities gradually are
written off with the planned pension payments.




t+1, must be necessarily equal to 0, reﬂecting that the pension




t+1 = 0. (7)
We can split up  GAx into two parts: the so-called net



































The net beneﬁt option consists of the change in the value
of liabilities Vt[Lx
t+1]−Lx
t due to new nominal accruals and
the writing off of planned nominal pension payments, plus
5 The claim on the residue is not just a ﬁctional claim in accounting terms. In
the Netherlands, the “system of value transfer” is operative. This system rules
that when an employee switches to another pension fund because of a new job,
the worker has the right to transfer wealth from the old to the new fund equal
to the value of accrued liabilities, including indexation.
the value of actual pension payments Vt[PPx
t+1] including
indexation, and the value of paid contributions Vt[Cx
t+1].
The net residue option says that a cohort gives away the
certain claim on the current residue Rx
t by participating in the
fund and it receives an uncertain claim on the residue at the
end of the evaluation period Rx
t+1, with economic value equal
to Vt[Rx
t+1].
Below, we compare some alternative policy variants to
study the impact on the generational accounts of cohorts. This
comparison is based on the expression
 GAx










alternative −  Rx
basic

 = 0. (9)
Stepping over from the current pension contract to an
alternative one may lead to a change of the generational account
option of cohort x, and this can be split up into changes in the
net beneﬁt option and in the residue option held by cohort x.
4.3. Pricing embedded options
The ALM framework is based on a simulation study which
projects the development of the pension fund in many future
scenarios.Thepolicyhorizonis20years.6 Asthispaperfocuses
on the method of value-based generational accounting, we have
suppressed the degree of complexity of the ALM framework.
The investment universe consists only of a MSCI world
stock index and nominal bonds with a constant maturity of
10 years. Furthermore we assume that wage inﬂation equals
price inﬂation, so that real wage growth is zero.7
In accordance with Campbell and Viceira (2002), we de-
scribe the return dynamics by a ﬁrst-order vector autoregressive
(VAR) model. The relevant economic factors zt in the model
include the short three-month interest rate, the 10-year zero
coupon rate, price inﬂation, stock returns in excess of the three-
month interest rate, and the corresponding dividend yield. Re-
turns on a rolling 10-year constant maturity bond portfolio are
constructedfromthenominaltermstructure.Formally,theVAR
is written as:
zt+1 = c + Bzt + Σζt+1
where ζt+1 ∼ N(0, I). In order to value the embedded options,
we specify the pricing kernel as:




tλt + λ 
tζt+1
6 An inﬁnite horizon for the pension contract and pension fund would be
hard to justify. We choose to evaluate the fund position at a ﬁnite horizon. On
the one hand, we aim for insights about the implications of a pension policy at
various horizons. On the other hand, it makes no sense to simulate too far into
the future, because we have only a limited amount of historical data to estimate
the return dynamics. A 20 year horizon reveals implications for short, medium
and long horizons.
7 The assumption of a real wage growth of zero avoids the problem of
valuation in an incomplete market. As there are no wage-indexed assets, risk
relating to real wage growth is not priced into the market. De Jong (2005)
discusses several methods to value wage-indexed cashﬂows in an incomplete
market.Author's personal copy
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where λt are time-varying prices of risk and Mt+1 is the
stochastic discount factor for valuation of embedded options
in the pension deal. For further technical details, we refer to
Nijman and Koijen (2006), Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) and
Ang and Bekaert (2004). Summary statistics of the data and
scenarios are provided in Table 1. Quarterly European data
(1973:III-2005:IV) are used to estimate the parameters in the
VAR system. MSCI world stock returns and dividend yield
are from Factset. German interest rates are from the Deutsche
Bundesbank. Stochastic scenarios are constructed by forward
iterating the VAR. Asset returns are used to determine the
returns on the asset mix. Interest rates are used to compute the
present value of liabilities, and inﬂation scenarios are employed
to index the liabilities.
Our ALM modelling process provides both classical as well
as value-based outcomes. The classical results include a set of
probability distributions for all relevant ALM output variables
in each future year. Asset returns and the asset mix policy are
used to determine returns on the asset mix. Real and nominal
interest rates are used to compute the present value of liabilities
in real and nominal terms. The inﬂation scenarios are employed
to index the liabilities.
We value embedded options in the pension contract
using the pricing kernel speciﬁcation, which is arbitrage-
free and consistent with the VAR return dynamics of the
economic environment. In this way, scenario-dependent and
thus stochastic discount factors (deﬂators) are assigned to the
scenarios (see Nijman and Koijen (2006), and Brennan and
Xia (2002)). Low discount rates are assigned to bad scenarios,
whereas high discount rates are assigned to good scenarios.
This reﬂects the prevailing risk aversion in the market which
implies that payoffs during bad times are more valuable than
payoffs during good times. Multiplication of the future payoffs
k periods from now (Pt+k) by the corresponding stochastic
discount factor (M∗
t+k = Mt+1Mt+2 ···Mt+k) and averaging
over all scenarios gives the current economic value Vt[Pt+k]











5. Evaluation of pension fund policies
We apply the methodology of value-based generational
accounting to analyse stylized examples of policy reforms for
a stand-alone pension fund with intergenerational risk sharing.
Using value-based generational accounting, we demonstrate
that changes in the pension contract may easily lead to sizeable
intergenerational value transfers as the allocation of risk
amongst stakeholders changes substantially. We evaluate three
types of policy changes: pension plan design (Section 5.1),
investment policy (Section 5.2) and the setting of the
contribution rate (Section 5.3).
5.1. Pension plan design
Fig. 2 provides four stylized examples of risk bearing in a
funded collective scheme with intergenerational risk sharing.
Diagram 1 in Fig. 2 reﬂects the case of a DB scheme with
Table 1
Summary statistics data and scenarios
y3 y10 π xs dy
Data
Average 5.56 6.72 3.46 4.32 3.05
stdev 2.70 1.67 1.34 17.26 1.21
Scenarios
Average 3.50 4.45 2.00 5.00 3.30
stdev 1.80 1.02 1.00 21.80 0.73
Annualized means and standard deviations are provided for the entire sample
(1973:III–2005:IV) and for the generated scenarios. Variables in the VAR are
3-month euribor (y3), 10-year zero coupon yield (y10), price inﬂation (π),
MSCI world stock returns in excess of 3-month euribor (xs), and dividend yield
(dy). Stochastic scenarios are constructed by forward iterating the VAR. We
transform the constant term (c) to impose a different mean on the scenarios.
no risk allocation at all to current members. There is full
indexation and a ﬁxed contribution rate, irrespective of the
ﬁnancial position of the fund. Actually, funding risks are shifted
forward in time and hence these risks must be borne by
future participants. Diagram 2 is a stylized representation of
risk allocation within a traditional DB plan structure, wherein
beneﬁts are guaranteed and funding risks are absorbed by
ﬂexible contributions. The third diagram reﬂects the risk-
allocation policy in what we have called a hybrid plan.
Contribution rate is ﬁxed. All participants take part in bearing
risk as this plan makes indexation of all accrued liabilities
solvency contingent. This is also the case in the collective DC
plan shown in the fourth diagram; however, no cap or minimum
is deﬁned in the indexation of accrued beneﬁts.
The horizontal axis in the four diagrams denotes the value of
assets A. A pension fund is said to be fully funded when assets
A equal the value of the real liabilities LR, the latter being
the value of accrued liabilities when full indexation is always
given. LR is calculated by discounting the accrued liabilities
with the real yield curve, net of real wage growth. The value of
the nominal liabilities, LN, is the value of accrued liabilities
when no indexation is given. The size of LN is determined
by discounting the accrued liabilities with the nominal yield
curve. The difference between real and nominal liabilities,
LR − LN is the required indexation reserve that is needed to
meet the promise of full indexation to plan participants. The
actualindexationreservepositionis A−LN anditmaybeeither
positive or negative.
Along the vertical axis, the contribution rate and the
indexation rate are set.
5.1.1. No risk allocation
No risk management implies that there is always full
indexation where the indexation rate it is equal to the wage
growth rate πt and the contribution rate Pt is always equal to
the base contribution rate P∗:
Pt = P∗ (10)
it = πt. (11)Author's personal copy
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Fig. 2. Different collective pension deals: pension deal 1 represents unconditional indexation and a ﬁxed contribution rate (Section 5.1.1); pension deal 2 is a
traditional DB plan with unconditional indexation and a dynamic contribution rate (Section 5.1.2); pension deal 3 is a hybrid plan with a dynamic indexation policy
(with boundaries) and a ﬁxed contribution rate (Section 5.1.3); pension deal 4 is a collective DC with dynamic indexation and a ﬁxed contribution rate (Section 5.1.4).
5.1.2. Traditional DB plan
In the traditional DB plan, displayed in diagram 2, the
indexation rate it is always equal to the wage growth rate πt:
it = πt. (12)
Funding risk is borne by the workers by means of
adjustments in the contribution rate. The contribution rate Pt
comprises two components: the base contribution rate P∗ and
the additional contribution rate Padd
t as follows:









Additional contributions are not necessary when assets At
match real liabilities LR
t . A situation of real underfunding,
At < LR
t , or real overfunding, At > LR
t , leads to a surcharge,
or to a cut in the contribution rate, respectively. A situation of
underfunding or overfunding is smoothed out over a period of
35 years. This is captured in the expression above by the term
in the denominator, reﬂecting the present value of pensionable
wages in the coming 35 years.
5.1.3. Hybrid plan
The contribution rate in the hybrid plan is stable and
independent of the ﬁnancial position of the fund:
Pt = P∗. (15)
There is room for full indexation equal to wage growth when
the value of assets is equal to or larger than the value of the
real liabilities, At ≥ LR
t . Then the actual indexation reserve
At − LN
t is at least equal to the required indexation reserve
LR
t − LN
t . The indexation rate will be zero when assets are
equal to or even below nominal liabilities, At ≤ LN
t . The actual
indexation reserve is then zero or even negative. Between these
two points, i.e. when LN
t < At < LR
t , indexation follows
wage growth partly where the given indexation is determined
by the proportion of actual indexation reserve in relation to the
required indexation reserve, as follows:












When assets exceed the value of indexed liabilities, there is
room to provide extra indexation until there is a full catching-
up of any previously missed indexation. This is reﬂected in
diagram 3 by the dotted line.
5.1.4. Collective DC plan
The collective DC plan can be seen as the counterpart of the
traditional DB plan regarding risk allocation. The contribution
rate is set at the level of the base contribution rate, and no
additional contributions are asked. Management of solvency
risk is run via the indexation rate, where the yearly indexationAuthor's personal copy
586 R.P.M.M. Hoevenaars, E.H.M. Ponds / Insurance: Mathematics and Economics 42 (2008) 578–593
Table 2
Classic ALM results for policy variants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Plan design NoRM TradDB Coll DC Hybrid Hybrid Hybrid Hybrid
Asset mix 50–50 50–50 50–50 50–50 100 eq 100 bo 50–50
Contribution policy fund fund fund fund fund fund acc
Funding ratio
Median 2025 103% 106% 107% 105% 112% 95% 118%
Mean 2025 106% 106% 109% 110% 125% 95% 123%
st dev 2025 26% 19% 16% 22% 52% 5% 26%
Mismatch risk av20yr 9% 9% 8% 8% 16% 4% 8%
Pw(A < N) 2025 25% 11% 4% 5% 49% 0% 1%
Contribution rate
Mean av20 yr 17% 18% 17% 17% 14% 22% 22%
jump a year av20 yr 0% 3.3% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Indexation ratio
Median av20yr 100% 100% 101% 91% 95% 74% 95%
Mean av20yr 100% 100% 106% 79% 72% 74% 86%
st dev av20yr 0% 0% 28% 13% 20% 8% 10%
P(IR < 100%) av20yr 0% 0% 62% 56% 40% 90% 43%
P(IRcum < 90%) 2025 0% 0% 43% 23% 28% 59% 9%
P(IRcum < 80%) 2025 0% 0% 31% 15% 20% 36% 4%
The median, mean and standard deviation of the real funding ratio are reported at the end of the 20-year evaluation period. Mismatch risk, deﬁned as the degree
of mismatch between the pay-off structures of asset mix and liabilities, is measured by the standard deviation of the growth rate of the funding ratio (cf. Leibowitz
et al., 1994): (RA−RL)
1+RL , with RA as return assets and RL as return liabilities. Pw(A < N) is the within probability of nominal underfunding—this is the probability
of reaching a position of nominal underfunding within the 20 year evaluation period. The third group of indicators relates to indexation quality. The median, mean
and standard deviation of the indexation ratio during the of 20 year period are shown. The yearly indexation ratio is measured as actual indexation over wage growth.
The term P(IR < 100) indicates the frequency of less than full indexation. As an indicator of the indexation quality cumulative over the whole 20-year period, we
report the probability that the cumulative value of the indexation ratio at the end of the 20-year period is less than 90% respectively less than 80% of cumulative end
value of full indexation.
is proportional to the funding position. Neither a cap nor a
ﬂoor is applied to the indexation rate. The reference variable for
the indexation rate is still wage growth. However, any funding
shortage or surplus will lead to a relative adjustment in the
indexation rate vis-a-vis the wage growth rate. Full indexation
equal to wage growth πt is given when At = LR
t .
Pt = P∗ (18)









5.1.5. Results—pension reforms and risk allocation
We apply a classic ALM study 20 years ahead and evaluate
theresultsusingvalue-basedgenerationalaccounting.Theasset
mix for the four variants of pension plan design is composed of
50% stocks and 50% bonds. The expected real rate of return
of assets for this mix is 4.5%, so the outcome for the base
contribution rate P∗ is 17% of pensionable wage income. We
set the initial real funding ratio at 85%,8 reﬂecting the current
underfunding of many pension plans.
8 For the stylized pension fund, this implies a nominal funding ratio of 120%.
A nominal funding ratio of about 140% corresponds with a real funding ratio
of 100%.
The classic ALM results for the four variants of plan design
are summarized in Table 2, columns (1)–(4). The text below the
table explains the indicators.
The expected funding ratio after 20 years for all four
variants improves strongly, as shown by the mean and the
median at the end of the evaluation horizon, which reach
values above 100%. The mismatch risk for a 50–50 mix for
the four variants is slightly higher than 8%. The variants
differ in how this mismatch risk is absorbed. The DB variant
with no risk absorption by current members implies that risk
is shifted forward in time to future members. This variant
has the highest spread in funding ratio as measured by the
standard deviation and the within probability of underfunding.
The traditional DB variant absorbs the mismatch risk by
adjusting the contribution rate in order to restore a situation of
underfunding or overfunding. This results in a high volatility
for the contribution rate. The average year-to-year change in
the contribution rate is 3.3%-point. The funding ratio risk and
probability of underfunding are reduced strongly due to the
ﬂexible contribution rate.
The hybrid plan and collective DC variants absorb mismatch
risk via indexation adjustment. The hybrid plan imposes a cap
(full indexation) and a ﬂoor (zero indexation) in indexation
adjustments. But the collective DC variant has no restrictions
regarding the actual indexation rate. This explains why the
hybrid plan shows more spread in the funding ratio compared
with the collective DC variant (compare standard deviation
funding ratios, 22% and 16% respectively, and the withinAuthor's personal copy
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Table 3
Embedded options in different pension deals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Plan design NoRM Trad DB Coll DC Hybrid Hybrid Hybrid Hybrid
Asset mix 50–50 50–50 50–50 50–50 100 eq 100 bo 50–50
Contribution setting fund fund fund fund fund fund acc
Residu option Vt[Rt,k] 1% 17% 21% 20% 12% 29% 28%
Surplus option Vt[St,k]+ 17% +21% +23% +23% +27% +29% +29%
Deﬁcit option Vt[Dt,k]− 16% −4% −2% −3% −16% −0% −1%
Option values related to pension fund residue at the end of the evaluation period as % of nominal liabilities in 2006.
probability of nominal underfunding, 5% and 4% respectively),
whereas the collective DC variant has more volatility in the
indexation ratio. The standard deviation for the indexation ratio
is 13% for the hybrid plan and 28% for the collective DC
variant, and the probability of a cumulative indexation ratio of
less than 80% is, for the hybrid plan 15%, and is 31% for the
collective DC plan. However, the collective DC plan delivers
the highest median and mean for the yearly indexation ratio.
The median and the mean of the indexation ratio are 101%
and 106%, respectively, for the collective DC plan, whereas the
hybrid plan has the signiﬁcantly lower values of 91% and 79%
respectively.
Now we turn to analysis in value terms. Table 3 reports the
residue option at the end of the 20-year period. The residue
option Vt[Rt,k] can be split up into a surplus option value
Vt[St,k] and a deﬁcit option value Vt[Dt,k], both with nominal
liabilities as “exercise price”. The surplus option is a European
call option on the surplus for the participants written by the
fund. The deﬁcit option can be seen as the economic value of a






































Columns (1) through (4) report the options related to the
end value of the residue for the four pension plan variants.
All variants start with a residue of 20% of nominal liabilities
in 2006. The value of the residue at the end of the 20-year
horizon shrinks in the no risk management plan to 1%. The
difference between the surplus and deﬁcit options is more than
32% and this difference is the largest of the four variants, as
in this variant there is no risk absorption through adjustments
in contributions or beneﬁts. The use of a ﬂexible contribution
rate in the traditional DB plan reduces the spread between these
two option premiums to 25%. Moreover the value of the residue
option is increased considerably, by more than 16%–17%, the
result of an increase in the surplus option 4% and a decrease in
the deﬁcit option by 11%. Note also that the spread in option
premiums can be further reduced if the pension fund were to
convert to the hybrid plan. The spread is reduced even more
in the collective DC plan. Furthermore, note that conversion to
Fig. 3. Generational account options for traditional DB plan and hybrid plan
expressed as % of total nominal liabilities in 2006 (y-axis) for various age
cohorts with age at 2006 on x-axis.
the hybrid plan and the collective DC plan is associated with a
further improvement in the residue option.
Our stylized example suggests that value transfers between
generations are larger in a traditional DB plan than they are in
a hybrid plan. Fig. 3 shows the outcome for the generational
account options held by the various cohorts over the 20-year
evaluation period for the traditional DB plan and the hybrid
plan. The horizontal axis shows the age of the cohorts at the
start of the evaluation period. The oldest cohort is aged 105 and
this cohort will die with certainty within 1 year. The youngest
cohort (-2) will be born within two years from now. At the end
of the 20-year evaluation period, these future participants will
be 18 and will join the labour force.
Fig. 3 shows that the generational account options for the
younger workers are negative, whereas the older generation
of workers and retirees have a positive generational account
option. The differing results for young and older workers can
be explained primarily by the levying of a uniform contribution
rate, whereas the value of newly accrued liabilities varies with
age. The value of new liabilities is lowest for the youngest
worker and highest for the oldest worker. This is the main
reason why the young have negative generational account
options, and older workers have positive generational account
options. In this paper, we take the realistic practice of a uniform
contribution rate and the implied redistribution from younger to
older workers as given.
The retirees have a positive generational account option. In
the traditional DB plan, they will receive full indexed pension
payments, whereas the initial position of the pension fund isAuthor's personal copy
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Table 4
Generational transfers due to pension reforms
(3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Plan design Coll DC Hybrid Hybrid Hybrid Hybrid
Asset mix 50–50 50–50 100 eq 100 bo 50–50
Contribution setting fund fund fund fund acc
GT 8.9% 8.8% 12.7% 4.9% 5.9%
Size of generational value transfers GT when traditional DB plan is replaced by variants. These intergenerational value transfers are expressed as % of nominal
liabilities 2006.
a situation of real underfunding. This also explains why the
generational account option for retirees in the hybrid plan is
lower as they must accept indexation cuts as long as there is a
situation of real underfunding.
Table 4 also clariﬁes that the move from a traditional
DB plan to a hybrid plan will lead to a considerable
redistribution of value from older members to younger
members. We can calculate the size of generational transfers by
using the expression below, which is based on expression (9),
where the term GT reﬂects the size of generational transfers.















In the remainder of this section, we explore in detail how
changes in pension plan design inﬂuence the embedded options
held by the various age cohorts. To this end, we decompose
changes in the generational account options into changes in
the underlying net beneﬁt options and residue options as
demonstrated in expression (8). The ﬁgures below display
the change in embedded options for each cohort when the
traditional DB plan is replaced by the hybrid plan (Fig. 4) and
when the hybrid plan is replaced by the collective DC plan
(Fig. 5).
The replacement of the traditional DB plan by the hybrid
plan (Fig. 4) would imply that the residue option for all
cohorts increases, reﬂecting the improvement of the residue
option for the pension fund as a whole. The impact on the
net beneﬁt option differs considerably between young and
old plan members. This option improves strongly for the
younger workers, whereas the older workers must accept a
severe deterioration. Note also that the net beneﬁt option
for the retirees decreases. All workers will beneﬁt from the
replacement of the ﬂexible contribution rate in the traditional
DB plan by the ﬁxed contribution rate in the hybrid plan.
Workers no longer lose value due to contribution increases in
bad times. The introduction of the hybrid plan implies that an
unconditional indexation policy is replaced by a conditional
9 Wecanalsocalculatetheimpactinvaluetermsforthedifferentcohorts.For
a 60-year old participant, the loss in value due to the conversion to the hybrid
plan is equal to almost 7% of the expected stream of full indexed beneﬁts to
be received during retirement or, stated alternatively, approximately 65% of the
average pensionable wage income in the industry. The value gain for the cohort
around the age of 25 is of similar size.
Fig. 4. Generational effects when stepping over from traditional DB plan to
hybrid plan expressed as % of total nominal liabilities in 2006 (y-axis) for
various age cohorts with age at 2006 on x-axis.
Fig. 5. Generational effects when stepping over from hybrid plan to collective
DC plan expressed as % of total nominal liabilities in 2006 (y-axis) for various
age cohorts with age at 2006 on x-axis.
indexation policy. All members lose value from this change
in indexation policy. Typically, indexation cuts will occur in
bad times and these cuts will then be very valuable. Catch-up
indexation is provided in good times when the funding ratio
is high; however, this additional indexation in good times is
not as valuable in value terms. The changes in net beneﬁt
options are negative from the age of 43 onwards. Hence for
workers older than 43, the loss in value due to a conversion to
a conditional indexation policy more than outweighs the gain
in value attributable to a conversion to a ﬁxed contribution rate
policy. For workers younger than 43, the contribution impactAuthor's personal copy
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on the net beneﬁt option is more valuable than the impact of
indexation.
The replacement of the hybrid plan by the collective DC
plan (Fig. 5) implies relatively minor effects on the generational
account options held by the various age cohorts compared with
the effects of replacing a traditional DB plan by a hybrid plan.
The effects are in line with expectations. The net beneﬁt options
decrease for all cohorts. They all lose value as there is no longer
a boundary on indexation cuts. Now even negative indexation
is possible; this will typically occur in very bad times and
hence will have a high value. From the classical ALM results,
we have seen that the collective DC plan provides an average
indexation ratio larger than 100% when a full indexation policy
is followed. However, high levels of indexation will typically
occur in good times and therefore have a low value. On balance,
the loss in value due to low or even negative indexation more
than outweighs the gain in value resulting from high indexation.
The counterpart of the decrease in net beneﬁt options is that the
residue options improve.
5.2. Investment policy in the hybrid plan
The various plans have up to now been evaluated using an
asset mix of 50% bonds and 50% equities. Now we examine
the impact on the hybrid plan of moving the asset mix toward
100% bonds or 100% equities.
In setting the contribution rate, it is common practice for
pension funds to follow a funding approach of taking into
account the expected rate of return on assets, net of expected
indexation costs. This practice is justiﬁed by the notion that, in
the long run, the sum of contributions and investment proceeds
must match the stream of future indexed beneﬁts; moreover a
ﬁxed discount rate mitigates contribution rate volatility. More
risk taking therefore warrants a lower contribution rate. An
important question, however, arises as to who is bearing the
additional risk? When retirees bear part of the additional risk
because their indexation is contingent on the ﬁnancial position
of the pension fund, then value transfers will inevitably occur
from retirees to workers.
Columns (4), (5) and (6) of Table 2 report the classic ALM
results for the hybrid plan with a 50%–50% asset mix, a 100%
equity mix, and a 100% bonds strategy. The lower rate of
return of the 100% bonds strategy implies an increase in the
contribution rate from 17% to 22% of pensionable wages. The
contribution rate in the 100% equity strategy is lowered to 14%
of pensionable wages.
Once again we approach the value-based analysis with a
comment on the changes in the residue option for the pension
fund as a whole (see columns (5) and (6) of Table 3). There is a
notable and heavy decline in the residue option when the asset
mix is switched to 100% equities. The 100% bonds strategy
leads to the elimination of nominal underfunding; the deﬁcit
option therefore falls to zero. The residue option equals the
surplus option as assets are always larger than the “exercise
price” of nominal liabilities.
Fig. 6 shows the generational account options for the three
investment strategies. Clearly, younger members are winners in
Fig. 6. Generational account options for hybrid plan and different asset mixes
expressed as % of total nominal liabilities in 2006 (y-axis) for various age
cohorts with age at 2006 on x-axis.
Fig. 7. Generational effects when asset mix hybrid plan is changed to 100%
equities expressed as % of total nominal liabilities in 2006 (y-axis) for various
age cohorts with age at 2006 on x-axis.
Fig. 8. Generational effects when asset mix hybrid plan is changed to 100%
bonds expressed as % of total nominal liabilities in 2006 (y-axis) for various
age cohorts with age at 2006 on x-axis.
value terms with a switch to a 100% equity strategy, whereas
older members beneﬁt from a switch to a 100% bonds strategy.
Figs. 7 and 8 display the changes in the generational accountAuthor's personal copy
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options for each cohort and its components, taking the hybrid
plan with a 50–50 mix as the benchmark.
The 100% equities strategy leads to a lower contribution
rate and this is beneﬁcial to all workers, leading to an increase
in their net beneﬁt options. However, this strategy makes the
funding ratio more volatile and so indexation risk is increased.
This implies a deterioration of the net beneﬁt option for all
retired workers. For workers younger than 54, the positive
impact of lower contributions on the net beneﬁt option is larger
than the negative impact of more volatile indexation. Older
workersandretireesexperiencealossintheirnetbeneﬁtoption.
The 100% equity strategy makes the funding ratio at the end of
the plan horizon more volatile, so the uncertainty regarding full
backup of liabilities by assets is increased. Hence, all members
lose value and they must accept a decrease in the residue option.
The net result of the changes in the two options is that younger
workers gain value whereas workers older than 43 and retirees
lose value.
The 100% bonds strategy is the mirror image of the 100%
equity strategy. Workers lose value as the contribution rate
is increased. All members gain value due to less uncertainty
around indexation, reﬂected by an increase in member residue
options as future residue is characterized by low volatility. In
this scenario, workers from the age of 43 onwards and retirees
are, on balance, winners, whereas younger workers lose value.
5.3. Base contribution rate in the hybrid plan
Thus far, we have determined the base contribution rate
by using the funding approach. For the discount factor in
determining the contribution rate, we use the difference
between expected rate of return on assets minus the expected
growth rate of wages. However, this method is subject to
scrutiny as it implies a break between reward taking and risk
taking. Current workers are rewarded by more risk taking
by a lowering of their base contribution rate, whereas the
associated additional risk is transferred to future participants.
Bader and Gold (2002) amongst others, postulated that the base
contribution rate must be settled using a fair value accounting
basis. Contributions must equal the fair value of new accrued
liabilities. This approach – which we will call “the fair value
accounting approach”– implies that the contribution rate for an
indexed plan must be based on the rate of interest rather than
the rate of return on assets.
For the hybrid plan with a 50–50 mix, we compare the
results of classic ALM output of the funding approach and the
fair value accounting approach. Compare columns (4) and (7)
of Table 2. The base contribution rate increases from 17% to
22% when the funding approach is replaced by the fair value
approach. Higher contributions lead to an improvement in the
solvency position and the indexation result. The improvement
of the solvency position is also evident in Table 3. The residue
option increases from 20% to 28% of the initial value of
nominal liabilities.
Fig. 9 delineates the changes in the embedded options.
All participants see an increase in their residue options.
Furthermore, retirees and near-retirees see an improvement in
Fig. 9. Generational effects when stepping over from funding to accounting
in hybrid plan expressed as % of total nominal liabilities in 2006 (y-axis) for
various age cohorts with age at 2006 on x-axis.
their net beneﬁt options as higher contributions lead to a higher
funding ratio and hence, higher indexation. Workers younger
than 55 see a decrease in their net beneﬁt options as the value
loss due to higher contributions eclipses the value gain from
higher indexation results. On balance, workers younger than 40
lose value while participants older than 40 gain value.
6. Evaluation of recent Dutch pension reforms
As intergenerational risk sharing is a distinguishing feature
of Dutch pension funds, we illustrate value-based generational
accountingtoevaluaterecentpolicychangesintheNetherlands.
Pension funds in the Netherlands play a very large
role in providing retirement income.10 In the postwar
period—up to the beginning of the 21st century—pension
plans were predominantly employer-sponsored, wage-indexed
beneﬁt plans with funding risks primarily borne by the
employer. As a result of the pension crisis in the years after
2000, employers increasingly withdrew themselves from the
role of risk-bearing party in pension funds. As there was strong
resistance among members against switching to individual
DC plans, pension funds transformed the employer-sponsored
deﬁned beneﬁt plans into stand-alone, multi-member plans
based on intergenerational risk sharing. They also reconsidered
the nature of the pension plan. The traditional DB plan structure
withﬂexiblecontributionsandﬁxedbeneﬁtswasnolongerseen
as an appropriate model for managing the solvency position.
The ever-increasing degree of maturity of Dutch pension
funds made the steering instrument of ﬂexible contributions
10 The Dutch pension fund system is very sizeable. It covers more than 90%
ofthe labourforce. Thevalue ofassetsunder managementatyear-end 2005was
more than 700 billion euros— around 130% of national income. There are 80
pension funds operating across all industries accounting for two-thirds of assets
and plan participants. An additional 600 company pension funds encompass the
remainder of assets and plan participants. Employee participation is mandatory
and this is governed via collective labour agreements. Most pension funds
(more than 95%) operate an indexed deﬁned-beneﬁt plan with indexation
conditioned on the funding position of the fund. The aim of most plans is
to deliver a supplementary pension income above the ﬂat-rate public pension
(payg) such that the sum of the public pension and the pension-fund pension is
equal to 80% of average wage income.Author's personal copy
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highly ineffective.11 The boards of trustees of many pension
funds aimed to reform the traditional DB plan structure in
such a way that the following three goals could be realized
simultaneously:[1]improvementofsolvencyriskmanagement;
[2] preservation of acceptable pension results; and [3] avoiding
intergenerational value transfers resulting from plan redesign as
much as possible.
Pension funds introduced the hybrid plan structure, with
ﬂexible indexation and ﬁxed contribution rate as the primary
method to enhance solvency risk management. The evidence
from stylized examples has clariﬁed that this reform indeed
leads to some improvement in solvency risk management,
however it comes at the price of a considerable reallocation of
value from older to younger members (compare Figs. 4 and 5).
Table 4 indicates the magnitude of intergenerational value
transfer when the traditional DB plan is replaced by the stylized
examples of pension reform discussed above. The move to a
hybrid plan with a 50–50 asset mix and the associated ﬁxing
of the contribution rate based on funding principles would
imply a value redistribution of 8.8% over the 20-year period
of evaluation, as discussed in Section 5.2. A hybrid plan would
justify a higher contribution level than the traditional DB plan.
Contributions in the hybrid plan are no longer applied to risk
bearing, so there is no reason why workers could lay claim
on the rewards of risk taking. Hence, any motivation for using
the expected rate of return on assets to set the contribution
rate no longer exists. This would validate the replacement of
the funding approach by the fair value accounting approach in
setting the contribution rate.
A pension fund necessarily must be orientated toward
ﬁnding the “most acceptable” policy mix with respect to
the interests of its various constituent groups. Combining the
hybrid plan and a 50–50 mix with the fair value approach
in setting the contribution rate may be an acceptable midway
position amongst the possible variants. Intergenerational value
transfer is 5.9% and of limited size, downside risk as measured
by the deﬁcit option (Table 3) is low and the pension result, as
measured by the outcomes for the indexation ratio, is relatively
good (Table 2).
The actual pension reform experience of Dutch pension
funds is very close to our reformulation of policy parameters.
7. Other applications
The value-based generational accounting method is applied
to a real existing industry pension fund. However the method
is broadly applicable to the evaluation of any institutional
arrangement which implies intergenerational redistribution and
risk-sharing.
11 Pension funds in the Netherlands have been operative since the 1950s.
The ratio of accrued liabilities over wages for a typical fund has now risen
to approximately 5 and it is foreseen that this ratio will increase further. Given
a maturity ratio of 5, the absorption of a 1% drop in the funding ratio would
require a 5% increase in the contribution rate. Restoration of the funding ratio
to a higher level would then require huge additional contribution payments,
that would erode the purchasing power of workers. A solution was found in the
use of cuts to the year-to-year indexation of accrued liabilities. A 1% increase
in funding ratio would require an indexation cut of 1% applied to all accrued
liabilities.
7.1. Public Finance
Generational accounting stems originally from public
ﬁnance with the pioneering work of Auerbach and Kotlikoff
(cf. Auerbach et al. (1999)). Usually, generational accounting
studies are performed in a deterministic setting. However,
future projections of tax revenues and government outlays
are subject to uncertainty. Generational accounts typically
use a real rate of discount that exceeds the real government
short-term rate, to adjust for the relative risk of future cash-
ﬂows. Sensitivity analysis for various discount rates can be
carried out to analyse the impact on generational accounts of
different degrees of risk. However this approach disregards the
differences in relative risk of government cash ﬂows. As the
relative risk of tax income, spending and transfer payments
differ, the theoretically appropriate risk-adjusted rates at which
to discount these ﬂows would also differ, and so will the impact
on generational accounts. Kotlikoff (2002) notes that the size
of these risk-adjustments in generational accounting remains
a topic for future research. We think the use of a stochastic
framework and value-based pricing with a speciﬁcation of
macroeconomic risks (productivity, real income growth) and
ﬁnancial market risks (term structure of interest rates, asset
pricing) would improve generational accounting in the ﬁeld of
public ﬁnance.
7.2. Social security reform
Many countries have initiated conversion programmes for
unfunded deﬁned social security schemes into privatized
funded deﬁned contribution schemes (cf. Chile and other
countries in Latin America, countries in Eastern Europe,
United Kingdom), whereas the US (Feldstein, 2005) and
many other countries are considering implementation of a
conversion programme. Such a conversion programme implies
a transition burden to be absorbed either by reduced beneﬁts
and tax increases or by replacement of implicit pay-as-
you-go debt by explicit government debt. Moreover, the
conversion programmes often are accompanied by minimum
return guarantees regarding the deﬁned contribution results.
Smetters (2002) values minimum beneﬁt guarantees in
proposals to privatize the US Social Security system and
ﬁnds that the system’s guarantees are very costly despite their
low probability. When risks, guarantees and costs are not
gauged accurately, social security reforms may easily lead to
unintended hidden value transfers between generations. Value-
based generational accounting may prove useful by helping to
prevent undesired value changes due to badly design reforms.
8. Conclusions
This paper aims to demonstrate the usefulness of value-
based generational accounting for pension funds with intergen-
erational risk sharing. Value-based generational accounting is
useful to control for the intergenerational value transfers that
may arise as an inevitable by-product of policy changes. These
transfers can be analysed with the help of changes in the val-
ues of the various embedded generational options held by theAuthor's personal copy
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participants. We have characterized the value-based approach
as supplementary to the classic ALM tool kit, which is already
used intensively by pension funds in decision-making on pen-
sion fund policy. Classic ALM evaluates the performance of
alternative pension contracts in terms of expected results and
risk measures for key variables like the funding ratio, the con-
tribution rate, and pension beneﬁts.
A number of stylized examples of policy changes in
risk allocation, investment policy and the setting of the
base contribution rate have been analysed. We calculate
intergenerational value transfers as changes in the values of
embedded options resulting from these policy adjustments.
We ﬁnd that any policy change will inevitably lead to value
transfers. A more risky asset mix is beneﬁcial to younger
members at the expense of older members, who lose value.
A reallocation of risk bearing from ﬂexible contributions to
ﬂexible beneﬁts also leads to value redistribution from old to
young.
Faced by a solvency crisis after 2000, Dutch pension funds
were forced by the supervisor to modify their pension contracts,
in operation since the 1950s, in order to improve solvency
management. Many pension funds replaced the traditional
DB plan structure consisting of ﬁxed beneﬁts and ﬂexible
contributions by a hybrid pension plan structure with ﬁxed
contributions and solvency-contingent indexation. Results from
the stylized examples are used to evaluate the recent reforms by
Dutch pension funds.
We have argued that a combination of the hybrid plan,
a 50–50 mix and the fair value approach in setting the
contribution rate may be an acceptable midway position
amongst the alternatives. The intergenerational value transfers
are of limited size, downside risk, as measured by the deﬁcit
option of the funding residue is low, and the pension result,
as measured by the outcomes for the indexation ratio, are
relatively good. The actual reforms of many Dutch pension
funds are very close to this reset of policy parameters.
We see value-based generational accounting as an important
extension of the tool kit of decision making for pension funds
with intergenerational risk sharing. This method is also useful
in evaluating any institutional arrangement which implies
intergenerational transfers, like public ﬁnance and reforms in
social security systems.
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